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ROBERT R. BIANCHI
URBAN BACKLASH AGAINST DEMOCRACY: 
BATTLING THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 
OR THE RISE OF RURAL POWER
ABSTRACT
During the 29 months between the overthrow of the Mubarak 
dictatorship and the military coup against the democratically elec-
ted government of Muhammad Mursi, about thirty million Egyptians 
voted in four major national polls – the constitutional referendum of 
March 2011, the parliamentary elections of November 2011-January 
2012, the presidential elections of May-June 2012, and the constitu-
tional referendum of December 2012. Despite the shifting alliances 
and counter-alliances that characterized these electoral battles, voting 
patterns reveal a consistent nationwide dominance of the Freedom 
and Justice Party that was rooted in the provincial capitals and villages 
of the Nile Delta with particularly enduring strength in Upper Egypt. 
Eventually, holdovers from the Mubarak regime allied with local elites 
(‘ayan) connected to the Wafd Party and with Christian groups tied to the 
Egyptian Block in mobilizing an opposition coalition that was centered 
in the more prosperous districts of Cairo and a handful of neighboring 
governorates in the southern Delta. Although the opposition managed 
to enlist the military in removing the elected government and repressing 
its followers, we can expect to see similar voting patterns if free elec-
tions are held again even if the competing parties adopt different names 
and slogans.
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gypt’s democratic revolution has unleashed countless 
power struggles illed with heroism, treachery, and 
bloodshed. Still, there is no end in sight. Egypt has seen 
many revolutions and it is certain to see even more. 
Democracy has not failed in Egypt. On the contrary, it has empowered 
millions who never dreamed of freedom because they devoted 
everything to daily survival and had nothing left for wishful thinking 
about a better future1. 
Indeed, it is precisely the sudden inclusion of the most forgotten 
parts of society that has provoked a counter-revolution by big city 
residents accustomed to grabbing all the best seats at the nation’s 
cheerless banquet of scarcity. For the more desperate members 
of Egypt’s urban elites and middle classes, the prospect of being 
permanently demoted to ordinary citizenship sparked enough panic 
to push them into the waiting arms of Mubarak’s old cronies and 
henchmen. The backlash spawned an unlikely coalition joining so-
called “liberals” and “secularists” with the very judges and police, 
and with the same landlords and generals – even the same Arabian 
monarchies – they had denounced in Tahrir Square three years before. 
The angry streets of Cairo gave birth to democracy but, when the same 
crowds saw their privileges slipping to the countryside, they rose once 
more to bury it.
But burying democracy is no easy matter. After thirty months of free 
elections and hard-fought referendums, Egyptian voters have created 
a nationwide electorate. Popular sovereignty is no longer a hollow 
slogan or a throw-away line in a sham constitution. Counter-revolution 
is bound to provoke its own antithesis, and the more vicious the 
repression today, the more certain the reaction tomorrow. Common 
people in every part of the country have learned quickly the art of 
building coalitions and counter-coalitions, and they continue to hone 
that talent with each passing day. History gives ample evidence that, 
once acquired, those political skills can long outlive the personalities 
and groups that perish in passing coups and purges. 
Sooner or later, Egypt will have more elections, and the winners 
and losers of the future might not be so different from the winners 
and losers of the post-Mubarak contests. Labels and shells may come 
and go, but the underlying social and economic conlicts are bound 
1. Bianchi 2013, pp. 87-138.
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to play out for generations. If we wish to anticipate the likely contours 
of Egypt’s future political struggles, we should try to understand more 
clearly the alliances and confrontations that have shaped voting 
behavior in the recent past.
THE CRITICAL CHOICES
On two occasions, voters had to make key decisions about the 
trustworthiness of institutions inherited from the old order. The 
constitutional referendums of March 2011 and December 2012 
amounted to up or down votes of conidence, irst, for the military 
and, then, for the judiciary. In both cases, the verdict went against the 
holdover elites and in favor of clearing the way for new blood2. 
The 2011 plebiscite endorsed a rapid timetable for phasing out 
military rule instead of a “go slow” option that would have delayed 
elections and civilian government until army-appointed jurists and 
politicians could hammer out a new permanent constitution. Outside 
of the capital city of Cairo, keeping the army in power was widely 
seen as a tactic to avoid – and even to prevent – free elections because 
they would inevitably relect the interests of the majority in the poorer 
provincial towns and villages. Hence, the fast track to democracy 
carried the day easily in every governorate. 
The 2012 referendum was more contentious and passed with a 
smaller margin. It approved a new constitution that tried to bolster 
the presidency over the judiciary. This vote amounted to much more 
than ine-tuning the separation of powers. It was, in fact, a direct 
confrontation between Egypt’s irst democratically elected president, 
Muhammad Mursi, and the judges who had dissolved the irst 
democratically elected parliament which was led by the president’s 
Freedom and Justice Party. The president won the showdown, but 
it was a Pyrrhic victory that enraged his enemies and sealed their 
determination to bring him down at all costs.
The counter-revolution aims not only to remove a government, but 
to destroy the political coalitions and social networks that undergird 
its power. The roots of the Freedom and Justice Party and its electoral 
allies have penetrated so deeply and widely into Egyptian society that 
they could probably produce democratic majorities for years and 
even decades into the future. That prospect is precisely the reason that 
their “liberal” rivals are so desperate to halt and reverse the revolution 
they once championed. The lethal force against Mursi’s supporters 




reveals the wider goals of the repression – not to settle scores and 
level the playing ield, but to wipe out the competition and drive it 
underground.
What are the social roots of the parties that battled for voters’ 
support in Egypt’s struggling democracy? How did they maneuver 
and adapt to changing threats and opportunities? And what makes the 
most successful contestants so menacing in the eyes of the losers and 
the holdovers from the authoritarian past?
Answering these questions requires a closer look at the legislative 
and presidential elections that took place between the constitutional 
referendums that paved the way for the rise and fall of Mursi and 
his party. Those elections produced luid and powerful coalitions 
that constantly surprised winners and losers alike, pushing them in 
directions they did not foresee and could not control.  
SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND COUNTER-ALLIANCES
Every one of the nationwide polls – referendums and elections alike 
– was a milestone in the revolution (Table 1). Enthusiasm and turnout 
remained high despite tedious delays and numerous runoffs. There 
was no evidence of “voter fatigue” even when sporadic violence and 
bitter court challenges marred the historic sense of political drama. 
Nonetheless, the presidential elections of June 2012 were a 
decisive turning point – a clear departure from the legislative elections 
just six months earlier and a harbinger of the divisive constitutional 
referendum six months later (Table 2 and Table 3). The electoral 
coalition that sent Mursi to the Presidential Palace was very different 
from the voter alignment that had put the Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP) in charge of Parliament3. Understanding the contrast between the 
FJP alliance and the Mursi constituency helps to explain the deepening 
polarization that upended Egypt’s democratic experiment.
In the parliamentary elections, the political arm of the Muslim 
Brotherhood rallied a wide cross-section of voters nationwide – in the 
big cities, the provincial towns, and the countryside4. FJP candidates 
ran well up and down the Nile valley, including the Delta in the 
north and the Sa’id in the south. All other parties were distinctly 
local operations, showing limited pockets of strength in one region or 
another, but nothing approaching the FJP’s national presence (Table 4).
3. Lajna al-Qida’iya al-‘Uliya lil-Intikhabat, 2012b; Lajna al-Qida’iya al-
‘Uliya lil-Intikhabat, 2012c.
4. Kristof, 2011.
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In the presidential elections, Mursi’s pattern of support paralleled 
the earlier results of the legislative polls, but he did much better in 
strongholds of the Nur Party than in districts that had elected deputies 
from his own party, the FJP (Figure 1 and Figure 2). Mursi did best in 
Upper Egypt –particularly in Fayyum, Beni Sueif, Minya, and Assyut 
– and in the poor Delta districts along the Mediterranean coast – 
Baheira, Kafr al-Sheikh, and Damietta. However, in between these 
zones, he lost nearly everywhere else. Cairo and the ive contiguous 
governorates of the southern Delta all favored Ahmad Shaiq, the 
former Air Force commander who had served as Mubarak’s last Prime 
Minister.
Shaiq’s strongest support came from the fertile river lands at the 
heart of Egypt’s agribusiness—Qalubiya, Sharqiya, Minuiya, Gharbiya, 
and Daqhaliya (Figure 3). These districts are historic bastions of the 
Wafd Party whose core of landlords and professionals encouraged an 
impressive turnout for Shaiq that put him in striking distance of Mursi 
until the very last votes were tallied. The sudden success of the local 
elites (‘ayan) in the Delta was a stunning turnabout from the legislative 
elections when the FJP had trounced their candidates in nearly every 
district, denouncing them as poorly disguised “leftovers”(feloul) of the 
Mubarak era5. 
In the six months between voting for Parliament and President, 
the combined forces of the Wafd and Mubarak’s former National 
Democratic Party came back with a vengeance6. They assembled a 
powerful counter-coalition against the FJP and Nur that swept all of 
the Delta except for Alexandria and the distressed Mediterranean 
districts that had suffered the greatest environmental degradation and 
outmigration.
Mursi’s urban losses were heaviest in Cairo, but he held his own 
in Giza and Alexandria. Even in the big cities, rural voters played 
an indirect role. Districts populated with recent migrants supported 
Mursi more than the well-established neighborhoods and upscale 
middle-class areas. In Cairo, Mursi carried the working class district of 
Helwan to the south while suffering his worst defeat in the wealthier 
suburbs of Madinat al-Nasr and Misr el-Gadida in the west. The most 
stunning turnaround in the capital city came in “Islamic Cairo” and its 
immediate neighbors. The FJP had made a clean sweep of the locally 
elected deputies – ten out of ten – but Shaiq won just as handily in 
this older business district as in the modern centers in Qasr al-Nil and 
the corniche7. 
5. Hussein, 2011.
6. El Din, 2012.
7. Bianchi, 2012, pp. 21-22.
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Giza went to Mursi, but the southern migrant zones gave him 
larger margins than the “posher” residential and commercial districts 
of Agouza, Dokki, and Mohandessin. Alexandria showed the same 
pattern – Mursi won big in the outlying neighborhoods to the northeast 
and southwest, but he just got by in the central business areas. In all 
three big cities, Shaiq ran strongest in the modern downtown districts 
and Mursi swept the transition zones on the peripheries where the 
inlux of rural migrants was most pronounced.   
Compared to the FJP’s wide-based coalition, Mursi’s support was 
much more concentrated in the poorer countryside, particularly the 
Sa‘id, and among urban migrants. These were precisely the voters that 
had rallied behind Nur’s candidates, propelling them to a stunning 
second-place inish in the national polls and in the new legislature8. 
Without intending it, Mursi’s campaign had made a clear tradeoff – 
shedding softer support in the big cities and the richer lands of the Delta 
while adding voters from the Muslim Brotherhood’s hardline religious 
rivals. From this point forward, Egypt’s revolutionary struggles were 
saturated with growing regional and class divisions that undermined 
any effort at political compromise.
Meanwhile, Shaiq’s campaign fashioned a powerful counter-
coalition around a core of Wafdists and former-NDP loyalists who 
had been biding their time in the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall. Soon 
they were joined by the Egyptian Block and their supporters in the 
more politicized factions of the Coptic community. In this context, 
voting for Mursi carried very different implications from voting for 
his party’s candidates in the earlier parliamentary polls. Now, it was 
a matter of entrusting the Muslim Brotherhood with executive plus 
legislative power – and this exactly when the two strongest Islamic 
parties seemed ready to lex their muscles together against everyone 
else. 
The Mursi-Nur rapprochement only served to reinforce these fears. 
Religious quarrels intensiied, aggravating the regional and economic 
cleavages that were already tearing society apart. In the midst of this 
social and ideological polarization, Egypt’s judges decided to dissolve 
the National Assembly, provoking a constitutional crisis that paralyzed 
government just when it need to deal decisively with a plummeting 
economy. 
8. Ahmed, 2012.
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THE COURTS TO THE “RESCUE”
On the eve of the presidential runoff between Mursi and Shaiq, 
Egypt’s High Court nulliied the newly convened Parliament, 
claiming that the election law was invalid because it discriminated 
against independent candidates while favoring political parties. The 
supposedly tainted deputies held only one-third of the legislature’s 
seats, but the court still insisted on disbanding the entire body and 
scraping the electoral system that produced it. At the time, the move 
was widely interpreted as a “judicial coup” by “Mubarak’s judges” – 
an eleventh hour attempt to tip the election to Shaiq and scuttle the 
FJP’s plans to combine legislative and executive authority. 
In retrospect, it’s impossible to know if, on balance, the court 
helped Shaiq or hurt him. Mursi was already on the defensive because 
his candidacy broke the Muslim Brotherhood’s earlier promise not to 
enter the presidential race. Besides, it was common knowledge that 
the lack-luster Mursi was a “spare tire” – a last-minute stand-in for the 
Brotherhood’s irst choice, Khayret al-Shater, who had been scratched 
from the list by election oficials because of an old criminal record. 
Some of Shaiq’s own backers later opined that the court inadvertently 
saved the day for Mursi by allowing him to pose as the target of a 
“counter-revolutionary” plot hatched by Mubarak die-hards. 
Soon after Mursi assembled a new government, the courts afirmed 
the dissolution of Parliament, paving the way for a series of clashes 
between the presidency and the judiciary that culminated in the 
constitutional referendum of December 2012. In the months leading 
up to the plebiscite, Mursi abruptly proclaimed and then renounced 
extraordinary executive powers to shield his decisions on legislative 
and electoral matters from judicial review. The referendum’s success 
bolstered Mursi legally, but it crippled him politically. It gave him 
formal authority to organize new legislative elections, but allowed 
his opponents to turn the tables by recasting him as the enemy of the 
separation of powers instead of its defender.  
The new constitution passed by a larger margin than Mursi’s 
narrow presidential victory – 64 percent compared to 52 percent. Yet, 
in demographic terms, the referendum was nearly a carbon copy of 
the Mursi-Shaiq contest (Figure 4). The regional and class divisions 
were just as deep, but now they were compounded by religious and 
ideological quarrels and projected onto constitutional decisions that 
could only be taken by sober minds acting in good faith9. As the anti-
Mursi street demonstrations gathered steam, their calls for military 
intervention grew more daring, their contempt for elections more 
explicit, and their thirst for revenge more chilling10.




When General Sisi seized power, he turned the crowds to his own 
purposes. Organizing an impromptu “plebiscite” of the streets, Sisi 
– now dubbed by the state-run media as “the Field Marshall of the 
people” – asked tens of millions of demonstrators for a “mandate” 
to ratify the military takeover and to endorse armed assaults against 
any “terrorists” that opposed him11. The General’s call was answered. 
Lethal attacks on pro-Mursi protesters came from the army, the police, 
and civilians. 
In the aftermath, it appeared that the use of force had been doubly 
disproportionate – not merely because of its excessive level, but also 
in its conspicuously heavy toll among protesters who had come to 
Cairo from the towns and villages of the poorer southern governorates. 
The writing on the shrouds of the victims told a familiar story of social 
inequality that was absent from the oficial narrative of “liberals” 
reclaiming their revolution from religious extremists. In many cases, 
the body covers proclaimed the home districts of the dead as well as 
their names: “Saadawy Mohammed from Beni Suief, Khaled Abdel 
al-Nasser from Qena” and so on12. 
Table 1. Timeline of elections and turning points in 
Egypt’s democratic revolution
Mubarak overthrown February 11, 2011
1st Constitutional referendum March 19, 2011
Legislative elections November 28, 2011-January 11, 2012
Court dissolves parliament June 14, 2012
Presidential elections May 23/24-June 16/17, 2012
Court upholds dissolution of 
parliament
September 23, 2012
2nd Constitutional referendum December 15/22, 2012
Mursi overthrown July 3, 2013
11. Feteha, 2013.
12. Fahim and El Sheikh, 2013.
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Table 2. Voting by Governorate in Constitutional Referendum 2011, 
Legislative Elections 2011-2012, Presidential Election 2012, 










Cairo 62.90 38.89 15.53 7.45 20.24 44.28 43.07
Giza 74.48 39.43 28.60 6.17 10.28 59.72 66.33
Alexandria 67.12 34.84 31.31 6.00 11.40 57.48 55.63
Beheira 87.71 35.38 38.95 8.70 3.69 58.58 75.47
Kafr al-Sheikh 87.92 30.22 33.97 13.12 0.69 55.41 67.60
Damietta 82.77 31.14 38.58 4.53 3.38 56.02 64.42
Daqahliya 79.71 33.34 27.85 10.60 2.46 44.38 55.19
Gharbiya 78.82 33.36 29.30 15.65 5.97 37.04 47.87
Menouiya 86.74 36.73 18.98 18.65 2.91 28.61 48.75
Sharqiya 86.64 36.83 23.60 12.28 5.21 45.73 65.95
Qalubiya 81.00 37.47 27.64 7.89 6.60 41.72 60.62
Beni Suef 87.47 40.75 33.97 10.08 3.43 66.50 84.84
Fayyum 90.25 44.95 33.38 2.17 3.58 77.76 89.43
Minya 76.63 41.40 24.96 5.14 12.14 64.42 83.19
Assyut 73.46 37.08 22.76 3.67 19.52 61.52 76.09
Sohag 78.65 26.71 26.28 5.88 15.80 58.24 78.82
Qena 86.08 29.39 20.54 7.48 2.01 55.67 84.68
Luxor 81.52 36.90 15.78 11.06 12.99 46.90 76.63
Aswan 76.63 33.79 23.70 7.80 9.25 51.93 76.65
Port Sa’id 70.79 32.66 20.69 13.89 9.65 45.76 51.13
Isma’iliya 77.89 38.19 27.63 7.40 6.65 54.25 70.03
Suez 78.83 26.84 45.55 4.63 8.37 62.74 71.07
North Sinai 86.24 37.02 20.44 5.74 1.64 61.51 78.30
South Sinai 66.93 42.53 0.00 16.66 11.17 49.70 63.43
Red Sea 63.38 35.69 0.00 9.69 17.01 49.37 62.64
Al-Wadi al-
Gadeed 90.94 19.64 55.70 4.00 7.47 63.38 87.34
Marsa Matrouh 92.41 14.46 67.79 6.78 1.75 80.12 91.66
Total 77.27 36.40 27.05 8.91 8.63 51.73 63.96
Mean 79.77 34.47 27.55 8.63 7.97 54.77 69.51
Stand. deviation 8.38 6.01 12.93 4.12 5.51 11.38 13.52
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Table 3. Voting by Governorate in Constitutional Referendum 2011, 
Legislative Elections 2011-2012, Presidential Election 2012, and 










Cairo -2.01 0.69 -0.88 -0.29 2.23 -0.92 -2.11
Giza -0.63 0.77 0.05 -0.60 0.42 0.44 -0.25
Alexandria -1.51 0.08 0.24 -0.64 0.62 0.24 -1.11
Beheira 0.95 0.16 0.78 0.02 -0.78 0.33 0.48
Kafr al-Sheikh 0.97 -0.61 0.43 1.09 -1.32 0.06 -0.15
Damietta 0.36 -0.47 0.75 -0.99 -0.83 0.11 -0.41
Daqahliya -0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.48 -1.00 -0.91 -1.14
Gharbiya -0.11 -0.14 0.10 1.70 -0.36 -1.56 -1.73
Menouiya 0.82 0.37 -0.63 2.43 -0.92 -2.30 -1.66
Sharqiya 0.82 0.37 -0.30 0.89 -0.50 -0.79 -0.28
Qalubiya 0.15 0.48 -0.02 -0.18 -0.25 -1.15 -0.71
Beni Suef 0.92 0.97 0.43 0.35 -0.82 1.03 1.22
Fayyum 1.25 1.60 0.39 -1.57 -0.80 2.02 1.59
Minya -0.37 1.07 -0.21 -0.85 0.76 0.85 1.09
Assyut -0.75 0.42 -0.36 -1.20 2.10 0.59 0.53
Sohag -0.13 -1.13 -0.12 -0.67 1.42 0.30 0.74
Qena 0.75 -0.73 -0.52 -0.28 -1.08 0.08 1.21
Luxor 0.21 0.39 -0.86 0.59 0.91 -0.69 0.57
Aswan -0.37 -0.07 -0.30 -0.20 0.23 -0.25 0.57
Port Sa’id -1.07 -0.24 -0.51 1.28 0.30 -0.79 -1.47
Isma’iliya -0.22 0.59 -0.02 -0.30 -0.24 -0.05 0.04
Suez -0.11 -1.11 1.25 -0.97 0.07 0.70 0.12
North Sinai 0.77 0.41 -0.53 -0.70 -1.15 0.59 0.70
South Sinai -1.53 1.24 -1.97 1.95 0.58 -0.45 -0.49
Red Sea -1.96 0.21 -1.97 0.26 1.64 -0.47 -0.55
Al-Wadi al-
Gadeed 1.33 -2.19 1.96 -1.12 -0.09 0.76 1.42
Marsa Matrouh 1.51 -2.97 2.82 -0.45 -1.13 2.23 1.77
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*Standard scores facilitate comparison across data sets that have 
different averages and statistical distributions. They allow us to gauge the 
relative degree to which voters in each district stand out from the rest of the 
electorate by supporting candidates and initiatives in a particularly strong or 
weak manner. For example, voters in Fayyum governorate were among the 
leading supporters of the FJP and then Muhammad Mursi. Minuiya voters 
were exceptionally loyal backers of the Wafd and then Ahmad Shaiq. And 
voters in Cairo were unusually critical of both constitutional referendums.
Table 4. Voting for Party Lists in the Legislative Elections 
2011-2012 and for Mursi in the Presidential Election 2012 
(Nile Valley, percent)
FJP Nur Wafd EB Mursi
Cairo 1 39.45 15.36 6.23 23.50 39.06
Cairo 2 35.65 11.31 5.76 26.22 45.81
Cairo 3 39.94 14.52 14.67 18.33 35.27
Cairo 4 40.48 19.35 7.32 13.14 51.07
Giza 1 41.09 29.10 7.80 10.52 61.52
Giza 2 37.83 28.12 4.60 10.05 57.98
Alexandria 1 34.41 29.85 6.40 16.02 57.52
Alexandria 2 35.32 32.96 5.55 6.15 57.45
Baheira 1 35.69 40.01 8.78 4.38 61.24
Baheira 2 34.66 36.47 8.51 2.08 54.77
Damietta 31.14 38.58 4.53 3.38 56.02
Kafr 1 29.83 38.92 12.16 0.00 57.76
Kafr 2 31.12 22.40 15.36 2.30 50.14
Minuiya 1 34.00 22.33 11.15 6.14 29.50
Minuiya 2 39.18 15.96 25.41 0.00 27.58
Gharbiya 1 28.67 29.73 13.79 7.40 35.62
Gharbiya 2 37.59 28.90 17.33 4.69 38.32
Qalubiya 1 35.67 23.35 10.96 4.98 35.22
Qalubiya 2 38.26 29.52 6.54 7.32 44.75
Daqhaliya 1 30.43 26.91 11.45 2.62 45.07
Daqhaliya 2 38.72 29.01 11.80 2.10 52.15
Daqhaliya 3 32.22 27.95 8.73 2.58 37.80
Sharqiya 1 37.99 26.55 10.53 6.68 45.71
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Sharqiya 2 35.54 20.80 13.95 3.81 45.75
Fayyum 1 44.89 29.06 3.58 2.26 74.79
Fayyum 2 45.05 40.03 0.00 5.61 82.59
Beni Sueif 1 39.47 35.00 11.42 0.00 64.96
Beni Sueif 2 43.17 32.02 7.54 9.93 69.38
Minya 1 46.29 22.25 3.81 5.67 64.95
Minya 2 35.77 28.09 6.68 19.59 63.78
Assyut 1 39.77 20.84 3.73 20.31 59.54
Assyut 2 32.57 25.96 3.57 18.19 64.83
Sohag 1 28.42 29.33 4.65 15.96 59.26
Sohag 2 22.70 19.14 8.75 15.41 56.15
Qena 1 32.62 21.88 8.91 0.00 55.76
Qena 2 26.03 19.16 5.99 4.10 55.47
Luxor 36.90 15.78 11.06 12.99 46.90
Aswan 33.79 23.70 7.80 9.25 51.93
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Figure 1. Vote for FJP lists 2011-2012 and for Mursi 2012. 
(Pearson’s r = .2628).
Figure 2. Vote for Nur lists 2011-2012 and for Mursi 2012. 
(Pearson’s r = .5111).
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Figure 3. Vote for Wafd lists 2011-2012 and for Shaiq 2012.
(Pearson’s r = .6903).
Figure 4. Vote for the 2012 Constitution and for Mursi. 
(Pearson’s r = .8169).
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